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C OMMENT

I

VOLUNTARY INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE
SUBSEQUENT TO AN ILLEGAL ARREST-A
PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
THE PROBLEM

A man is arrested without probable cause. He is given the
proper warnings as to his right to counsel and his right to remain
silent. Having this knowledge, he voluntarily confesses to a crime.
rs the confession admissible as evidence against this person, or must
it be excluded because of the prior illegality of the arrest?
The problem to be discussed in this Comment involves four
major elements. First, the suspect must have been arrested illegally. That is, he must have been arrested without a warrant, and
without sufficient probable cause as would have constituted
grounds for the issuance of a warrant. Second, the suspect must
have been adequately advised of his rights in conformity with the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,' and
he must have fully and intelligently waived these rights. Third,
the confession must have been uttered completely voluntarily. Finally, no other form of illegality, such as an undue detention or prolonged questioning may be present. With these factors met, the
question becomes one of the admissibility of the statements into
evidence against the accused in a criminal trial in which he is the
defendant.'
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

The history of this problem is long, complicated, and tenuous.
The United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on the
relationship between an illegal arrest and a subsequent voluntary
confession. Few cases reaching the lower courts have been on point,
and the decisions in these cases have been so patently at odds with
each other, that no established rule can be said to prevail. Within
the same jurisdiction, courts have differed on the question of
1.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2. The scope of this Comment encompasses only the restrictions of
the last statement. Thus, the use of a confession merely to impeach a witness is not considered. Nor is the use of a confession of one defendant as
evidence of the guilt of a second defendant treated. The use of a confession against a defendant in a civil trial is, likewise, not covered within
this paper.
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whether to admit such a confession.8 At the present time the body,
of law concerning this problem is in a state of confusion.
Since the advent of the exclusionary rule of evidence, originating in the federal courts, 4 and made applicable to the states by
Mapp v. Ohio,5 the question of whether to treat voluntary confessions in the same manner as physical evidence has arisen repeatedly
in both state and federal courts. The first case general acknowledged as attempting to meet the issue was McNabb v. United
States.6 This case, however, dealt with confessions made after an
unreasonable delay, in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.7 The case involved an intimation of coercion and involuntariness. Therefore, although often cited as demanding the exclusion of all confessions subsequent to such delay,
it is uncertain that this case can be considered as absolute authority
even for this proposition. Furthermore, although cited as also demanding similar exclusion of voluntary confessions made after an
illegal arrest," McNabb is at best a weak basis for such a contention
because this issue was never raised in the case.
Moreover, that all confessions obtained in violation of Rule
5(a) must be excluded remains in serious doubt at the present.
Later Supreme Court decisions have followed the reasoning advanced in McNabb,9 but these cases are distinguishable because of
the doubt presented as to the voluntariness of the confession excluded. Even in light of Miranda, this question is still somewhat
open. While hinting that an undue delay in commitment proceedings is itself highly indicative of the involuntariness of any contemporaneous confession, the Court did not specifically state that
the presumption of involuntariness may not be successfully rebutted. 10 Therefore, McNabb does not support the exclusion of all
3. Massachusetts serves as an illustration of this contention. The
District Court for the District of.Massachusetts has held that under Wong
Sun, an illegal arrest does not render a subsequent voluntary confession
inadmissible (United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508, 511 (D. Mass. 1963),
aff'd, 328 F.2d 399 (1964) ), while in Commonwealth v. Young, 206 N.E.2d
694 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1965), without overruling United States v. Burke,
the court, in dicta, stated that Wong Sun demanded exclusion of all such
confessions.
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
7. Rule 5(a), inpertinent part, isto the effect that an arrested person
must be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available committing magistrate.
8. In Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948), the Court, in
dicta, stated that the scope of McNabb extended to all voluntary confessions made after any illegality. But see People v.Freeland, 218 Cal. App.2d
199, 32 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Upshaw v. United States, supra note 8,and Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
10. The Court in Miranda also specifically stated that its ruling was
not to supersede Mallory v. United States, supra note 9, or, therefore,
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confessions following illegal arrest.
Only one recent Supreme Court case has been decided which
attacked the precise question of the effect of a prior illegal arrest
on the admissibility of a subsequent voluntary confession. Wong
Sun v. United States," decided in 1963, has made such an impact
upon later federal and state decisions, and has led to such a pronounced split of authority, that this case warrants detailed analysis.
Wong Sun involved the confessions of two defendants. Defendant Toy was illegally arrested by six or seven federal narcotics
agents. The officers broke through the door of Toy's laundry after
rightly being refused admittance. They then pursued Toy through
the laundry and into the bedroom occupied by Toy, his wife and
family. There they proceeded to question Toy, and during this time
he confessed. The confession implicated defendant Wong Sun, who
was arrested, questioned and later released on his own recognizance
without having confessed. Several days later, Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the police station and confessed to his participation in the crime.
Toy's confession was excluded by the Supreme Court as being
"fruit of official illegality, '12 but Wong Sun's confession was admitted on the basis that the connection between the prior illegal
arrest and the later confession had "become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint."' 3
In a five-to-four decision, the majority opinion stated at one
point: "[T] he policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite [no]
logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence."' 14 Yet,
the Court also found it improper to hold that all evidence, unlike
tangible fruits of an illegal search or seizure, is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but
for the illegal actions of the police.' 5 The contradiction in these
two statements has led to much confusion in subsequent lower
court decisions. Some state courts have seized upon the former
as absolute authority that all confessions, regardless of their voluntariness, must be excluded if preceded by an illegal arrest. 1 LikeMcNabb, but rather that the two rules were to exist simultaneously.

See

384 U.S. at 463 n.32. It would seem, then, that the purpose of Rule 5 (a) is
not merely to insure that a person is notified of his rights, but primarily to
avoid prolonged questioning. However, Rule 5(a) is sufficiently flexible
that a situation could exist where a somewhat lengthy questioning would
be permitted.. (See Mallory v. United States, supranote 9, at 455.)
11. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
12. Id. at 485.
13. 371 U.S. at 491.
14. Id. at 486.
15. 371 U.S. at 486-87.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78, 81 n.3 (2d Cir.
1965) (dictum); United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964); Gatlin
v. United States,. 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Commonwealth v. Young,
349 Mass. 175, 206 N.E.2d 694 (1965); State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App.2d 533,
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wise, the latter statement
has often been utilized as authority for
17
the opposite view.
The former statement is subject to much criticism. What the
Court meant to be verbal evidence is at best unclear. It is questionable, however, that an absolute similarity exists between all
verbal evidence illegally obtained and physical evidence so obtained. The exclusionary rule, as it applies to physical evidence is
made applicable to the states on a constitutional basis-a combination of the principles of the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments."8 In effect, it prevents a person from being confronted with
physical evidence obtained without regard to due process and presented in such a way as to violate the defendant's right against
self-incrimination. The courts have recognized that the reasons for
excluding physical evidence so obtained are also applicable to certain forms of verbal evidence-that gained through illegal wire
tapping, eavesdropping devices, and coercion. 19 To say, however,
that a defendant who freely confesses to a crime fully realizing
the import of his statement, is being subjected to the identical deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights as one confronted with
a statement made in ignorance of its possible incriminating content,
is totally without merit. Likewise, no valid similarity exists between the situation in which physical evidence illegally seized is
used against a person, and the instance in which his own voluntarily
given incriminating statement is so used. It should be noted that
the majority in Wong Sun made no reference whatsoever to a
constitutional basis for their decision in excluding Toy's confession.
This, it is submitted, clearly demonstrates that despite their language, the Court does recognize a distinction between certain
206 N.E.2d 5 (1965); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1965); State
v. Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1963).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 992 (1966); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig
v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 352 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); Royers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th
Cir. 1964) (dictum); United States v. Burke, 328 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1964);
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dictum); United
States v. McCarthy, 249 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (dictum); State v.
Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963); State v. Kittashiro, 42 Hawaii
204, 397 P.2d 558 (1964); Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d 226 (1963);
State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982
(1965).
18. For a case using the fourth amendment as a basis for the decision, see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). The decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is based upon the demands of the
fifth amendment, while that of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) is based
upon principles involved in the fourteenth.
19. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919) (involving illegal wiretaps); Silverman v. United States, supra note 18, and
McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955) (involving eavesdropping devices); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Lynumn v. State of
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(involving coerced confessions).
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types of verbal evidence obtained illegally, and tangible evidence
so procured.
There being no constitutional basis for excluding Toy's confession, it still remains uncertain what the actual basis was. In light
of the fact that Wong Sun's confession, although also preceded by
an illegal arrest, was admitted into evidence against him, it would
seem that a causal relation was considered. The Court seemed to
be saying that there was no direct relation between the arrest and
the confession. Additional language of the Court would seem to
bear this out. After considering the circumstances leading up to
Toy's confession-the breaking into Toy's establishment by the officers, questioning Toy in the presence of his family, as well as the
illegality of the arrest-the Court stated: "Under such circumstances it is unreasonable to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion ..

. . "2

This leaves open the possibility that in cer-

tain situations acts may intervene which would negate the effect
of the prior illegality of the arrest. As to defendant Wong Sun,
such an act was present. The remaining question is merely one of
degree-what constitutes such an act of free will.
It is noteworthy that many lower courts have interpreted the
decision in this manner.2 1 In United States v. Close,2 2 the Fourth
Circuit Court stated:
We think the Court in Wong Sun clearly indicates the
view that a statement which is shown to have been freely
and voluntarily made without coercion, either physical or
psychological, may be thereby purged of
23 any stigma of illegality, and the statement is admissible.
Although these words were merely dicta, they illustrate this court's
position, and also one of the prevailing views throughout the
country.
Since no constitutional basis was offered for the exclusion of
Toy's confession it is arguable that the Court in Wong Sun, in applying the exclusionary rule to Toy's confession, was utilizing its
20. 371 U.S. at 486.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 992 (1966); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig
v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965), a! 'd, 352 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.
1965); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963); People
v. Freeland, 218 Cal. App.2d 199, 32 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1963); Peal v. State,
232 Md. 329, 193 A.2d 53 (1963); Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318, 193 A.2d 40
(1963); Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 318, 191 A.2d 226 (1963); State v. Jackson,
43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965).
Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion without feeling

the need to refer to Wong Sun. Washington, for example, has done this.
See State v. Carpenter, 63 Wash.2d 577, 388 P.2d 537 (1964); State v. Keating, 61 Wash.2d 452, 378 P.2d 703 (1963).
22. 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1965).

23.

Id. at 851 (dictum) (Emphasis added.)

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

supervisory powers24 in an effort to curb the use of the investigative arrest. Although the Court did not expressly so state, this
was what was done in the earlier McNabb decision, and an extension to meet the facts of Wong Sun seems plausible.
While it may be contended that the exclusionary rule as applied
to voluntary confessions seems to be established, at least in the Supreme Court, there is room for the thinking that Wong Sun may
have limited it somewhat, and perhaps have formulated a new test
for determining whether the confession is to be admitted or excluded. The test may now be shifted from the mere presence or
absence of an illegal arrest being determinative, to a test where
the causal relation between the illegality and the subsequent confession is controlling.
THE PRESENT SPLIT

Whatever may be the solution suggested by Wong Sun, it is

apparent that this decision has not satisfactorily answered the question of whether a prior illegal arrest renders a voluntary confession
inadmissible. Nor has the Supreme Court commented on the precise problem since Wong Sun. State courts and lower federal courts
continue to reflect the conflict of authority at the present time.
For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently reversed a lower court decision which had admitted the
spontaneous confession of a man illegally arrested. 25 Defendant
Lyons had been in a car driven by defendant Spriggs. Spriggs
was validly arrested for possessing narcotics, but Lyons was arrested merely on the basis of the arresting officer's suspicion that
he, too, possessed narcotics. In a two page opinion, Lyon's confession was excluded solely because of the prior illegal arrest.
Within a month of this decision, the New Jersey
Supreme
Court stated that as long as the prosecution could establish that
the confession was uttered
voluntarily, the prior illegality of the
26
arrest would be irrelevant.
In these jurisdictions the respective approaches are firmly established. 27 These decisions represent the split of authority among
the courts;
neither represents what may be fairly called a majority
2 s
view.
24. For cases dealing with the right of the Supreme Court to exercise
its supervisory powers over federal courts, see Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1937).
25. Lyons v. United States, 221 A.2d 711 (D.C. App. 1966).
26. State v. Cook, 47 N.J. 402, 221 A.2d 213 (1966) (dictum).
27. See Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cited
by the Lyons court as binding authority, and State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148,
203 A.2d 1 (1964), referred to in Cook.
28. For cases which have admitted a voluntary confession made after
an illegal arrest, see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex Tel. Craig v.
Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965), ajf'd, 352 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1965);
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Although many of these decisions are announced with some degree of certainty, a close look at the cases cited as authority will
often force out the confusion lurking behind the decisions. In
Lyons v. United States,2 9 the court cited only one case as authority
for excluding the confession. This case, Bynum v. United States,30
involved not a voluntary confession, but fingerprints, illegally obtained. Defendant Bynum was told to come to the police station if
he wanted information concerning his brother's arrest. Once there,
he was illegally arrested and subjected to fingerprinting. These
fingerprints were excluded from evidence. Whatever its merit, the
case is poor authority for the proposition that voluntary confessions preceded by an illegal arrest must be excluded from evidence. 31
Those courts which have refused to adopt the exclusionary rule
have chosen the voluntariness of the confesion as the guiding criterion for admission or rejection of the confession.3 2 Although
Reeves v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 346 F.2d 915 (3d Cir. 1965);

United States v. McGavic, 337 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1965); cert. denied, 380
U.S. 933 (1965); Ralph v. Peppersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342

(10th Cir. 1964); United States v. McCarthy, 249 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1966
(dictum); United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1958), aff'd,
328 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1964); People v. Freeland, 218 Cal. App.2d 199, 32
Cal. Rptr. 132 (1963); State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963);
State v. Kittashiro, 42 Hawaii 204, 397 P.2d 558 (1964); People v. Novak,
33 Ill.2d 343, 211 N.E.2d 235 (1965); Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d
226 (1963) ; State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379

U.S. 982 (1965); State v. Keating, 61 Wash.2d 542, 378 P.2d 703 (1963).

Contra, United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78, 81 n.3 (2d Cir. 1965)
(dictum); United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964); Gatlin v.
United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Lyons v. United States, 221
A.2d 711 (D.C. App. 1966); Commonwealth v. Young, 349 Mass. 175, 206
N.E.2d 694 (1965); State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App.2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5
(1965); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1965); State v. Mercurio,
194 A.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1963).
29. 221 A.2d 711 (D.C. App. 1966).
30. 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
31. For cases which seem to lack a substantial basis for the decision,
see United States v. McCarthy, 249 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Commonwealth v. Young, 349 Mass. 175, 206 N.E.2d 694 (1965); State v. Thompson,
1 Ohio App.2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v.
Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810 (1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 414
Pa. 21, 198 A.2d 595 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Light v. Maroney, 413 Pa.
254, 196 A.2d 659 (1964).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 992 (1966); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel.
Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 352 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); United States v. McGavic, 337 F.2d 317
(6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 933 (1965); Rogers v. United States,
330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Hollingsworth
v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dictum); United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp.
508 (D. Mass. 1958), aff'd, 328 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1964); People v. Freeland,
218 Cal. App.2d 199, 32 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1963); State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246,
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these jurisdictions have followed the Supreme Court mandates to
exclude coerced confessions33 and physical evidence obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures; 34 and although they have
recognized that illegal arrests are made in violation of due process,35 they have generally held that where a confession is freely
cautioned as to his rights, any
given, and the defendant adequately
36
prior illegality is irrelevant.
Several of the states have categorically applied the exclusionary rule, without regard to the voluntariness of the confession;
any prior illegality will render the confession inadmissible per
se.3 7 For example, the Ohio court used the following language to
justify the use of the exclusionary rule:
Since the arrest was unlawful, all statements as well as
196 A.2d 755 (1963); State v. Kittashiro, 42 Hawaii 204, 397 P.2d 558 (1964);
People v. Novak, 33 Ill.2d 343, 211 N.E.2d 235 (1965); Stewart v. State, 232
Md. 318, 193 A.2d 40 (1963); Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 318, 191 A.2d 226
(1963); State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 201 A.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 982 (1965); State v. Carpenter, 63 Wash.2d 577, 388 P.2d 537 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Boles, 221 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. W.Va. 1963);
Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 151 A.2d 898 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Spardute, 218 Pa. 37, 122 Ati. 161 (1923); State v. King, 78 S.D. 442, 103
N.W.2d 656 (1960).
34. See, e.g., Mosco v. United States, 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1962);
People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651 (1962); People v. O'Neill,
11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95 (1962).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959);
United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957).
36. See State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 982 (1965), which applied the procedure specified in Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), requiring determination of voluntariness by the
judge in the first instance. If an affirmative finding is made, the issue is
then presented to the jury, along with an instruction to disregard the confession if they find it to have been involuntarily made.
It is also generally required that the prosecution overcome a presumption of involuntariness and show conclusively that the arrest did not
induce the confession; see, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961);
State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755 (1963); State v. Kittashiro,
42 Hawaii 204, 397 P.2d 558 (1964); People v. Novak, 33 Ill.2d 343, 211 N.E.
2d 235 (1965); State v. White, 405 P.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1965); State v.
Cook, 47 N.J. 402, 221 A.2d 213 (1966); State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156, 188
A.2d 406 (1963).
37. Ohio, for example, follows this approach, see State v. Thompson,
1 Ohio App.2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5 (1965), as does Rhode Island (see State v.
Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1965); State v. Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574
(Sup. Ct. R.I. 1963) ). It would appear that the District of Columbia also
adheres to complete exclusion (see Lyons v. United States, 221 A.2d 711
(D.C. App. 1966); Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ).
However, see Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
which appears to indicate that if the causal relationship is sufficiently attenuated, a voluntary confession will be admitted, even though preceded
by an illegal arrest. A similar doubt seems to exist in Massachusetts (see
material in note three). See also State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965) (admitting the confession), and
United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964) (excluding the confession, supposedly on the basis of New Jersey law).
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the physical evidence seized are the fruits of such unlawful
Court
action, and, as such, under the ruling of the Supreme
38
of the United States, are inadmissible as evidence.
This diversity of reasoning is not confined to state courts. Many
lower federal courts have arrived at opposite results, often citing
Wong Sun or other previous decisions as absolute authority for
3
their respective positions. 1

40
In United States v. Marrese, the

Third Circuit cited Wong Sun for the proposition that a voluntary
confession must be excluded if preceded by an illegal arrest, while
41
the Fifth Circuit, in Rogers v. United States, stated that under

Wong Sun, if a confession is voluntarily made a prior illegal arrest
may be irrelevant.
This conclusively shows that, while often referred to as such,
the exclusionary rule as applied to voluntary incriminating statements is not a federal rule at all. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
refused to grant certiorari for many of the cases decided in the cirhave been admitted confessions uttered after an
cuit courts which
42
unlawful arrest.

THE RATIONALE UPON WHICH THE OPPOSING CONTENTIONS ARE BASED

Many sound arguments have been made for both the abolition

of the exclusionary rule as applied to voluntary confessions, and for
strict adherence to the rule. 43 Among those advanced by the proponents of the exclusionary doctrine, perhaps the most sound contention is that illegal arrests are constitutionally forbidden, and to
admit confessions obtained thereafter is to tacitly condone such
practices. Police are permitted to violate the suspect's rights with
virtually no punishment, except the exclusion of any and all evidence gained by means of these violations. Doubtless, this is the
basis for many decisions which have excluded such evidence.
38. State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App.2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5, 10 (1965).
39. United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 992 (1966); Ralph v. Peppersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965); Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); United States v. McGavic, 337
F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 933 (1965); Hollingsworth
v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1964); contra, United States v.
Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964).
40. 336 F.2d 501, 504 (3d Cir. 1964).
41. 330 F.2d 535, 540-42 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916
(1964).
42. United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 992 (1966); Ralph v. Peppersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965); Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); United States v. McGavic, 337 F.2d
317 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 933 (1965).
43. For articles expressing many of the ideas contained herein, see:
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43
ILL. L. REV. 442 (1948); Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42
MIcH. L. REV. 679 (1944); Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope,
42 NEs. L. REv. 483 (1963).
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Proponents of the non-exclusionary rule often reply: "The judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be an indirect process
of punishment. ' 44 To exclude statements which are solely a product
of the defendant's desire to confess to his criminal acts-solely a
product of his free will-is to punish police for ends accomplished
through means which are often vitally necessary. 45 In many cases,
a police force will be possessed of evidence, which though not sufficient for the issuance of a warrant, is sufficient to convince them
of the suspect's guilt. In these cases, it is often of vital importance
to arrest the suspect whenever possible, before he flees from the
jurisdiction, goes into hiding, or commits further criminal acts. To
deny the existence of such instances is to deny examples of practical experience. Yet, to permit police to arrest a person on the basis
of the most meager evidence-the barest suspicion-is to ask for infringements of the rights of citizens. The practicality of drawing
the necessary line of distinction, however, is a most difficult task.
Although the rules of evidence, ideally, should not operate as
punishing factors upon law enforcement agencies, a deterrent is
definitely needed, and many courts have turned to the exclusionary rule as the only practicable force available.
It is often said that for an unlawful arrest, the individual has
recourse via a civil suit. It is submitted, however, that this is an
inadequate remedy. If a person does have something to hide, he
will not be willing for it to come to light in a civil action. Also, if
the evidence gained from the illegal arrest is used against him, and
publicized, even though it is later excluded, a jury is more likely
to be sympathetic with the police than with a confessed criminal.
Clearly then, there is a need for some sort of restriction upon
the power of the police to arrest any suspect, whether probable
cause exists or not. Yet, absolute exclusion of any and all admissions gained after an illegal arrest is not the answer.
A second argument in support of the exclusionary rule is that
an illegal arrest may tend to have a coercive effect. This would
prevent any ensuing confession from being completely voluntary.
It can readily be seen, however, that any arrest, even if perfectly
valid, may have the same effect. The Supreme Court's mandate in
Miranda for warnings precedent to in-custody interrogation, seems
adequate to dispel whatever coercion may be implicit in illegal ar44. 4 WIGMORE, EviDENcE, § 2183 (2d ed. 1923). See also United States
v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70, 71: "Our duty in shaping rules of evidence
refers to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power is not to be used
as an indirect mode of disciplining misconduct."
45. In the words of Mr. Fred E. Inbau:
Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best qualified
police departments, are capable of solution only by means of an
admission from the guilty individual or upon the basis of informa-

tion obtained from the questioning of other suspects.

Inbau, supra note 43, at 447.
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rests. Assuming the prosecution can establish the statements to
have been freely given, there is no valid reason why an illegal arrest would be more coercive than a completely legal arrest.
A further contention advocated by those who would at least
modify the exclusionary rule is that an illegal arrest, if the exclusionary rule is strictly applied, "will often have the effect of completely immunizing the defendant from any inquiry; and, indeed,
prevent the use of even spontaneous statements. ' '46 Thus, if police
are led by a voluntary confession to tangible evidence or fruits of
the crime, the prior illegality of arrest will preclude its use at trial.
4
This exclusion, under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, T
would seem unnecessarily burdensome on the police, when the confession is proved to be voluntary.
The American Law Institute provides a modification to this
rule in their Proposed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
Under this proposal, if the prosecution can positively establish
that the evidence would have come into their hands regardless of
the information gained by questioning the defendant, then the evidence will be admissible. 4 The fact that the police found it necessary to arrest the defendant in the first place without sufficient
probable cause, however, may indicate that they had no other way
of obtaining the additional evidence. The possibility that the prosecution will be able to establish the requisite probability of obtaining the evidence through other sources, is, therefore, extremely
small. Thus the need is apparent for a formula which will not
automatically exclude all confessions made after illegal arrest.
A PROPOSED MODIFICATION
The need for the exclusionary rule as applied to voluntary confessions, it has been shown, rests not so much on a constitutional
basis, as on the premise that the rule is designed to prevent other
violations of the constitutional rights of a suspect in a criminal
trial, by imposing a check upon illegal police activities. The rule
has evolved almost through a process of elimination; since no other
effective form of preventing police from unconstitutionally arresting a person seems workable, the exclusionary rule has emerged
as virtually the only practicable check. Its purpose has been to
safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens, yet in
this goal it has not succeeded. Or, at best, it has succeeded to a
limited extent, in that it has introduced new problems along with
solving a few old ones. If it be conceded that the number of extralegal police practices has diminished in recent years, this is not
46. American Law Institute, Tentative Draft No. 1, A Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure (1966),

Commentary to Article 9, at p. 212

(hereinafter referred to as A.L.I., Code).
47. This phrase, as near as can be determined, originated in Nardone

v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).

48. A.L.I., Code, § 9.09.
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due to the effect of the exclusionary rule as applied to voluntary
confessions. Rather, this decline in abusive practices has been
brought about by mandates, applicable to the states through consti49
tutional bases, such as found in Brown v. Mississippi, Mapp v.

Ohio, and Miranda v. Arizona.
The exclusionary rule not being satisfactory to a great number
of jurisdictions, it follows that some other method must be found
to accomplish the purposes of the rule. It is submitted that if the
rule were a check upon only the most flagrant violations, it might
meet with more universal acclaim. If a method of alleviating the
harshness of a strict application of the exclusionary rule could be
formulated, more courts would see fit to adopt the basic principles
of the rule. Such a modification is found in the recent proposal by
the American Law Institute. Section 9.02 of the Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure provides:
If a law enforcement officer, acting without a warrant,
arrests a person without reasonable cause.

. .

, and the

court determines that such arrest was made without a fair
basis for the belief that such cause existed, no statement
made by such person after such arrest and prior to his release, unless it is made in the presence of or upon consultation with counsel, shall be admitted in evidence against such
person in a criminal proceeding in which he is the defendant. 50
The Note on this section of the Code provides that: "[E]xclusion would not be required where the officer acted in good faith under emergency circumstances and with colorable justification,"51
even though the arrest was technically illegal.
The purpose of this section of the Code being to "deter the
'investigative' arrest,"52 it would seem that in providing for exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the Code poses an equitable easing
of the harshness of penalizing all illegal arrests, merely because
they were made on the basis of technically insufficient cause. At
the same time, the Code provides a check on arrests made on only
slight suspicion or solely for the purpose of questioning a suspect.
The determination whether the arrest was made with the requisite "good faith" could be satisfactorily made by an adaptation of the
rule of Jackson v. Denno. Thus, the facts of the particular arrest
would be submitted to the trial judge for consideration. If he de49. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
50. A.L.I., Code, § 9.02.
51. Id. at p. 65. The words "under emergency circumstances" as
used in the A.L.I. Code must be interpreted broadly. The Code reporters
explained these words thus: "[WI here the officer makes an excusable error
A.L.I., Code, Commentary to
under the pressure of circumstances; ......
Article 9, at p. 212. That "emergency circumstances" are not meant to be
strictly limited is further shown by the devoting of another section to permissible procedure in instances of "urgent necessity." A.L.I., Code § 9.11.
52. A.L.I., Code, at p. 65.
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termined that the arrest was made upon a reasonable belief that
cause existed, then the confession could be submitted to the jury
with an instruction that if they found that the arrest was not made
in good faith, then the confession could not be considered. If, after
being considered by both the trial judge and the jury independently,
the arrest was found to have been reasonably made, there would
be no need for the unjustly harsh penalty of excluding the confession. This is assuming, of course, that the confession was completely voluntary and made after the necessary warnings.
Supplementary to this proposal, a penalty could be imposed
upon an officer who made an arrest, despite the knowledge that
probable cause did not exist. The penalty prescribed would necessarily have to be sufficiently strict so that it would deter similar
action in the future, while also permitting an arrest to be made
wholly in good faith. It might be argued that a stringent penalty
would have the effect of deterring even the good faith arrest. However, it is submitted that a penalty would, rather, encourage more
thorough investigation techniques and require law enforcement officers to be more cautious, as well as deterring unlawful arrests and
safeguarding the rights of citizens. In the words of one legal writer,
expressing his opinion of the exclusionary rule as it now stands:
Were judges half so astute in the instigation and judicial support of direct proceedings against offending police
officers as they are ready with the easier indirection of releasing criminals, they would far more satisfactorily enforce
respect for constitutions-and would preserve the public
safety as well.53
It is apparent that the exclusionary rule, applied without effective statutory sanctions to all confessions made after an illegal
arrest, is by no means entirely desirable. It acts as a harsh penalty
upon what are often honest and desirable attempts on the part of
police to protect citizens and to further the ends of justice. While
the result sought by the exclusionary rule is valid, the rule itself
is often ineffective, and at best a poor substitute for the procedures
which could be enacted by an alert legislature.
JEFFREY C.

53.

Waite, supra note 43, at 692-93.
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